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Abstract—Due to the importance of security in many critical 
applications in MANETs and the limitation of the resources in 
mobile devices, it is important to have lightweight 
cryptosystems. Although some lightweight certificateless 
cryptosystems for MANETs have been proposed, it is possible to 
improve them in the term of reducing the complexity of the 
computations. In this paper, we have tried to propose a 
lightweight certificateless public key cryptographic scheme 
based on bilinear pairings. In addition, we compared our 
proposed scheme with other existing certificateless pairing 
based and result shows that the proposed scheme is more 
efficient based on computational cost and the rate of growth of 
computational expense viewpoints. 
Keywords—Certificateless PKC, Bilinear Pairings, 
Lightweight, MANETs. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
These days popularity of distributed applications has led to 
the emphasizing of security issues in wide categories of 
mobile networks. Variety of mobile applications required 
security services and this causes many researchers to focus on 
the security issues over this kind of networks especially 
mobile ad hoc that is to overcome a subset of vulnerabilities 
in MANETs [1, 2]. 
MANETs, which are in the category of fixed-
infrastructure-free wireless networks consist of movable 
nodes without the need to any centralized management. More 
precisely, involving nodes are responsible to perform the 
network functions, such as routing, cooperatively. The 
especial features of MANETs made these networks 
appropriate for a wide range of crucial applications such as 
military and battlefield ones such as rescue operations. 
However, the lake of a fixed infrastructure made it 
challenging in terms of security issues [3].  
Previously, suggested security solutions by the researchers 
were mostly based on the attack-oriented approaches [4-8]. In 
fact, after identifying possible threats, they enhanced available 
schemes or designed a new one. Moreover, proposed schemes 
based on these approaches just cover limited attacks and could 
be once again vulnerable to some other attacks or a 
combination of them [1].   
Cryptography has been widely used to provide the security 
of mobile ad hoc networks in general design framework [1]. 
However, the nature of resource constrained nodes is one of 
the significant problems that enforced developers to propose 
lightweight and less resource consuming cryptosystems in 
MANETs. The above mentioned reasons were sufficient to 
persuade some researchers that traditional public key 
cryptosystems such as RSA or DSA are not acceptable to use 
in such networks [8, 9]. Therefore, the use of symmetric 
cryptosystems became the basis for cryptographic schemes 
such as RC5 [10] and Skip-Jack [11] in resource constrained 
platforms for many years [12]. However the use of symmetric 
cryptosystems suffers from a subset of disadvantages 
especially key management problem. This problem can be 
overcome with the use of public key cryptographic schemes 
that could make key management security services easier and 
reduced the overhead of transmitting processes [13, 14]. It is 
due to this fact that many researchers have proposed public 
key cryptosystems that are lightweight enough in order to 
make them implementable in resource constrained nodes.  
To make the use of public key cryptosystems feasible in 
mobile ad hoc networks, elimination of Public Key 
Infrastructure (PKI) has been one of the interesting 
challenging issues. To reach this goal, Adi Shamir proposed 
the idea of Identity-based cryptosystems in order to eliminate 
the need to certificates and PKI management [15]. This 
cryptographic idea remained an open problem for seventeen 
years, until Boneh and Franklin [16] proposed a practicable 
solution. From there onwards many researchers have been 
pursuing the fully functional solution of Boneh and Franklin 
in a large variety of Identity-based cryptographic primitives, 
such cryptosystems which suffer from a significant problem 
namely the Key Escrow. More accurately, in these 
cryptosystems there is a trusted third party, PKG, who 
possesses the private-key of all existing entities. To solve this 
problem, Al-Riyami and Paterson proposed a novel 
cryptosystem to capture the advantages of both Identity-based 
and traditional, named Certificateless PKC [17]. In this 
category of cryptosystems, the main idea is the use of 
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identifier not as a public key, but to eliminate the need to 
public key certificates beside of solving Key Escrow problem.  
In order to draw appropriate cryptosystems for mobile ad 
hoc networks, a number of certificateless public key 
cryptosystems have been proposed [18, 19]. However, none of 
them seems to be reliable enough to be used in some crucial 
applications. In addition, the efficiency of the proposed 
schemes needs to be further improved so that it is appropriate 
for resource constrained problem devices of mobile ad hoc 
networks. The aim of this research is to propose a 
certificateless cryptosystem in the context of MANETs, 
named C RSA, which is an improvement of IDRSA [18] in 
terms of time and computational efficiency perspective.  
II. TECHNICAL BACKGROUND  
Bilinear pairings is the preliminary requirement of 
certificateless cryptosystem. The followed subsection briefly 
introduces bilinear pairings which is defined on algebraic 
groups over Elliptic Curves.  
Bilinear pairings 
Bilinear maps are based on Miller algorithm [20]. A 
bilinear map, a cryptographic building block in designing 
pairing-based cryptosystems, is in fact a deterministic 
function such as  which is defined over three algebraic 
groups. In more detail, assume that there are three algebraic 
groups ,  and of a prime order q. Then, a map such as ̂ :     is a bilinear pairing if it can support three 
of the following characteristics as stated below: 
   
i. Bilinearity, means that  
 , , , : ̂ , ̂ ,  
ii. Non-degeneracy, means that if ,   and  are identity 
elements of , and , respectively, then “e” do not 
map any pair of  to  unless , . 
iii. Computability, means that for any and , there 
must be an efficient algorithm to compute ̂ , .  
 
It is worth noting that because of the widely usage of 
pairing-based applications, many researchers have propose 
several efficient bilinear pairings schemes. Weil pairing and 
Tate pairing are examples of the most recently used bilinear 
pairings in cryptographic schemes [21, 22]. Implementing 
bilinear pairings is mathematically complex and this research 
excludes the details of this category of cryptographic maps. 
However, to implement bilinear pairings, the mentioned three 
groups are defined over algebraic elliptic curves. There exist 
various documents that have tried to investigate algebraic 
groups, which are defined over different Elliptic Curves. 
Many reasons could persuade cryptologists to use elliptic 
curves based cryptosystems. One of the most significant 
advantages of using ECC based algebraic groups in compare 
with RSA based on the need of a smaller key size in the same 
security level [23, 24]. 
Different types of bilinear pairings 
It is possible to define three different pairing types based 
on the proposed pattern in [25]. To introduce different types 
of this kind of cryptographic maps, assume that the considered 
bilinear pairing appears in the form of ̂ : . Then, 
different types of bilinear pairings can be defined as followed: 
Type 1 bilinear pairings 
In this category of pairings there exists two efficiently 
computable homomorphism between and in both 
directions (but it is usually supposed that ). This type 
of bilinear pairing is efficient, but it is not easily possible to 
obtain more than 80 bits security level [25]. 
Type 2bilinear pairings 
In this category of pairings, there exists an efficiently 
computable homomorphism from to , but it is not 
efficient to find a homomorphism from  to  . It is 
necessary to note that it is possible to obtain more than 80 bits 
security level for this category of bilinear pairings, but the 
main problem of them is that computations over G2 group 
operations are expensive [25]. 
Type 3 bilinear pairings 
In this category of pairings, there is not any efficiently 
computable homomorphism between G  and G . It is worth 
mentioning that it is possible to obtain more than 80 bits 
security level for this category of bilinear pairings and 
computations over G2 group operations are not expensive. 
However, this type of pairing is not as efficient as Type 1 
bilinear pairings [25].  
It is worth pointing out that knowing the features of 
mentioned types and supposing valid assumptions to build a 
cryptographic scheme, is one of the most important parts of 
developing pairing-based cryptosystems. The reason is that 
although building cryptographic schemes through assuming 
black-box pairings is not necessarily a bad approach, it is 
sometimes easy for designers to make invalid or impractical 
assumptions [25]. 
III. RELATED WORKS OVER CERTIFICATELESS PUBLIC 
KEY CRYPTOSYSTEMS IN MANETS 
As mentioned, in an identity-based cryptosystem each 
entity must collect its private key from PKG. Hence PKG can 
eavesdrops the messages or impersonate entities. This 
inherent problem in identity-based cryptosystems called key 
escrow. This problem limits the use of identity-based 
cryptosystems to closed organizations [26]. Early solutions 
focus on utilizing more key pairs, using threshold, and 
considering expiry date for the master key. However, they 
have some drawbacks that make them unsuitable for 
MANETs such as too much overhead to the network, more 
computation /communication for nodes which are resource 
constrained devices [1]. 
In 2003, a novel public key cryptosystem was introduced 
by Al-Riyami and Paterson [17], named certificateless public 
key, that could overcome the key escrow problem while 
public keys are authenticated without need to the PKI. In this 
cryptosystem, a trusted third party called Key Generator 
Center (KGC) is responsible for generating partial private 
keys for the users. This key is driven by master key (only 
known by KGC), and the users’ identity. Then, each user can 






produce his private key. The user’s private key can be 
generated by the use of partial private key received from KGC 
and a secret value chosen by the user hence there is no 
problem regarding to the key escrow [26]. Since, in the CL-
PKC the partial secret key generated by the KGC ‘implicitly’ 
certified the public key, the certificates are not needed [26]. 
Therefore, for the public key authentication process, the 
public key of the KGC is required. 
The purpose of this section is to probe into IDRSA from 
cryptographic functionality viewpoint.  
An overview of IDRSA scheme 
The main objective of this subsection is to investigate the 
IDRSA protocol. IDRSA tries to guarantee that the public keys 
are just accessible by the trusted entities to make the protocol 
protected against RSA cryptanalysis attacks. To reach this 
goal, it is assumed that any user is a member of a logical 
group of users named coalition. To obtain the public key of 
other side party, existing users must ask the required public 
key from the coalition that the considered user if a member of. 
Based on these assumptions, the rest of this subsection 
investigates the phases of IDRSA and the correctness of this 
protocol logically. 
 Main phases of IDRSA 
It can be claimed that the core part of IDRSA scheme is 
consisted of three main phases that we named them Setup, 
Node Initialization, and Public-key Obtaining Process. To 
have better understanding of the proposed scheme, the IDRSA 
three main phases will be reviewed here briefly.  
Setup: In this phase, a trusted third party generates public 
parameters of the cryptosystem (Params) after taking the 
security parameters as below: : , , , , , ̂ , , , ,  
Here, , , ,  and ,  are three 
algebraic groups of the same prime order . In addition, 
 and ̂ : is a bilinear pairing over 
mentioned algebraic groups. Moreover,  is a positive integer 
number that determines the number of bits of the two 
components of the RSA public key ( and ) for existing 
users. Beside of these, : 0,1 , : 0,1  and : 0,1 0,1  are three one-way collision-free hash 
functions 
Node Initialization: The basis of this phase is to generate 
a subset of public and private parameters for existing users 
and coalitions, besides publishing a subset of public ones. The 
public parameters of mentioned entities are named Identity-
key, General-key and public-key. Here, Identity-key of any 
user is computable by all other existing ones, while General-
key and Public-key must be generated by the owner of them. 
To support freshness, Identity-key of the user or coalition “i" 
(which possess ) would be created as followed: 
 
Here, the entity who possess randomly chooses the 
prime number as a randomly chosen element of   
or . Then, each node such as node “i” runs the RSA 
key generation algorithm to generate the parameters , ,  . 
Such as traditional RSA scheme,  and , are the 
private-key and public-key of mentioned entity, respectively. 
After that, mentioned user or coalition publishes the 
value .  as the General-key. 
Public key obtaining process: In the last predicted phase 
of IDRSA, each user can refer to the considered coalition that 
the other party is a member of, to take the required Public-key 
securely. In the sake of simplicity, assume that node needs 
the Public-key of node , and sends the request to the 
desirable coalition named . Then, the "Public key 
obtaining process" will be done by performing followed three 
steps. 
 
Step1:  : ,  
In this step, the node A introduces himself by sending , then 
requests to obtain the Public-key of the node B( and )by 
sending  to the  coalition.  
 
Step2: : , , ,  
In this step, the coalition  first of all checks if the node 
B is in the list or not. Then it will send mentioned parameters 
to the node A. Here, the mentioned four parameters are as 
follow: 
 ,  that  is equal to ̂ , ̂ , ,  .  and  
 
Step3: Public key extraction by A 
In this step, the node A tries to extract the requested Public-
key of the node B ( and ) and verify its authenticity by 
performing followed computations:  
First of all, A computes ̂ , ̂ , , 
and then computes . Result of  must be 
equal to . After that, node A computes . 
Finally, to verify the authenticity of the public-key of node B 
( and ), node A checks if . , to decide whether 
accept or reject the calculated public-key pair of the node B.  
 
Investigating the correctness of IDRSA 
To investigate IDRSA logically, it must be proved that the 
user A and the coalition will achieve the same value 
by computing and  , respectively. The calculations below, 
can show that the result of both computations is the same 
value ̂ , . ̂ , ̂ ,̂ , ̂ ,̂ ,  ̂ , ̂ ,̂ , ̂ ,̂ ,  
 
As a result, it can be concluded that IDRSA is logically a 
correct scheme. 
IV. PROPOSED SCHEME:  
This section discusses the proposed certificateless PKC 
scheme named  , which is an improved version of 
IDRSA from computational efficiency viewpoint. In more 
detail, we demonstrated that our proposed scheme can 
perform less computation in the initialization phase in 






compare with IDRSA. It is worth to note that in this part, our 
proposed scheme, , is compared with IDRSA from 
computational efficiency perspective. 
An overview of  
scheme has three main phases named Setup, 
Node Initialization, and Public-key Obtaining Process. 
However, the computational expenses are more lightweight 
than IDRSA. In more detail, these phases are described as 
follow 
Setup: In this phase, the KGC takes the required security 
parameter to issue the public parameters of the cryptosystem 
(Params) as followed: : , , , , , ̂ , , , ,  
 
The elements of the tuple params are as follow: 
is a large prime integer, , , ,  and ,  are three algebraic groups with the same order . 
is an element of the group . The map ̂ : is a 
determined bilinear pairing over mentioned three groups. In 
addition, the element refers to an integer number that 
determines the number of bits for the public key of the RSA 
cryptosystem ( and ) for existing entities. Moreover, : 0,1 , : 0,1  and : 0,1 0,1  
are three one-way collision-free hash functions 
 
Node Initialization: Similar to IDRSA scheme,  
consisted of some entities that can be users or coalitions. In 
the Node Initialization phase, the public and private 
parameters for mentioned entities will be generated and a 
subset of public ones will be published to all other entities. 
Such as IDRSA, the public parameters of  scheme are 
identity-key, general-key and public-key. All entities are able 
to compute the identity-key of existing users, but to generate 
general-key and public-key, the owner of them must do that. 
Similar to the IDRSA scheme, the identity-key of the entity 
who possess  identifier would be generated as follow: 
 
 
Then, mentioned entity randomly chooses the prime 
number  that . After this, mentioned entity runs the 
RSA key generation algorithm to generate the 
parameters , ,  . The same as traditional RSA scheme,  
and , are the private-key and public-key of 
mentioned entity, respectively. Finally, mentioned entity 
publishes the value .  as the general-key. 
 
Public key obtaining process in : 
Similar to IDRSA, in the last phase of  each user 
refers to the considered coalition and requests for the public-
key of the other side party. Roughly speaking, we assume that 
node  needs the public key of node , and sends the request 
to the desirable coalition named . Then, the "Public 





Step1:  : ,  
In this step, the public parameter introduces the node A as 
the one who issued his request. Moreover, the public identity 
determines the other party who his public key (  and ) 
is requested by A.   
 
Step2: : , , ,  
In this step, the coalition  will send back the tuple , , ,  to node A. Here, the mentioned four 
parameters are as below: 
,  that  is equal to ̂ , , .  and . 
 
Step3: Public key extraction by A 
In this step, the node A extracts the public key of the node B 
( and ) and verifies its authenticity by performing 
followed computations: 
Firstly, A computes ̂ , , then computes 
. Clearly, the result of  must be the same as . 
In continue, node A computes . Finally, to 
verify the authenticity of the public key of the node B 
( and ), the node A checks if .  to decide 
whether accept or reject the calculated public key pair of the 
node B. 
 
B.   Investigating the correctness of  
To investigate logical functionality of , we show 
that the user A and the coalition will achieve the 
same value by computing and  , respectively. The two 
calculations below, prove that the result of both computations 
is the same value ̂ ,  ̂ , ̂ ,  ̂ , ̂ ,  
As a result, the functionality of is logically 
correct. 
 
V. EFFICIENCY COMPARISON BETWEEN  AND 
IDRSA  
Because of the high expense of bilinear pairings in 
compare with other group operations [27] the comparison of 
computational expense emphasizes on computing and  
parts of IDRSA and  schemes. This comparison is 
based on assuming that and parts of  and IDRSA 
schemes are constructed by Type2 or Type3 bilinear pairings. 
Then, computational expense of these parts are calculated and 
compared together. Moreover, the rate of growth of 
computational expense for mentioned parts are depicted in 
two separate diagrams. 
Computational expenses of IDRSA and  schemes 
In order to make the IDRSA more efficient, in the 
proposed scheme, we have tried to decrease the 
number of utilized bilinear pairings. The main reason is that 
the pairing operations are more expensive than modular 
exponentiation and scalar multiplication operations [27]. The 
Table I illustrate the expenses of operations (pairings, 






modular exponentiation and scalar multiplication) in Type2 
and Type3 bilinear pairings based on the assumptions of the 
[27]. The reason that we just emphasized on Type2 and Type3 
bilinear pairings is that Type1 bilinear pairing is limited to 
obtain less than 80 bits security level, while the use of Type2 
and Type3 bilinear pairings can lead to obtaining 128 bits or 
256 bits security level [27]. 
TABLE I.  COMPUTATIONAL EXPENSE OF GROUP OPERATIONS INTYPE2 




Multiplication in G1 (M1) 1 1 
Multiplication in G2 (M2) 45 3 
Exponent in GT (ET) 3 3 
Pairing (P) 21 20 
 
To compute the efficiency of IDRSA and  
schemes we focused on the computational expense of  
or parts of " Public key obtaining process," which is the 
core of the difference between mentioned schemes. Based on 
the Table I, computational expense of  or  part in IDRSA 
is equal to “ET+M1+2P”. 
Table II illustrates the expense of these parts in IDRSA 
scheme followed by the values of the Table I. 
TABLE II.  COMPUTATIONAL EXPENSE OF  OR  PARTS IN IDRSA 
SCHEME 
Pairings type Type2 Type3 
Computational expense 46 44 
 
Furthermore, based on the Table I, computational expense 
of or parts of public key obtaining process in  is 
equal to M1+P. Table III demonstrates the expense of these 
parts in scheme.  
TABLE III.  COMPUTATIONAL EXPENSE OF  OR  PARTS IN 
SCHEME 
Pairings type Type2 Type3 
Computational expense 22 21 
 
To conclude the results of the tables Table II, Table III, it 
is clear to realize that  scheme requires less 
computational cost for the used operations than the IDRSA 
scheme. To see this improvement more accurately we can 
refer to the Table IV. This table demonstrates the percentage 
of computational efficiency improvement of  scheme 
in compare with IDRSA. 
 
TABLE IV.  IMPROVEMENT PERCENTAGE OF COMPUTATIONAL EXPENSE 
OF   SCHEME IN COMPARE WITH IDRSA  
Pairings type Type2 Type3 




This issue would be more drastic during the growth of the 
number of requests for public key obtaining process in 
IDRSA and  schemes. Figure 1 and Figure 2 depict 
the rate of growth of computational expense for or parts of 
public key obtaining process of the schemes IDRSA and 
 scheme as a function of the number of requests. 
 
 
Figure 1.  Growth rate of computational cost based on Type2 pairings 
 
Figure 2.  Growth rate of computational cost based on Type3 pairings 
Figure1 assumes that the used bilinear pairings of all 
IDRSA and schemes are Type2, whereas Figure2 
assumes that mentioned bilinear pairings are Type3 ones. 
 







In this paper, the functionality of the improved version of 
IDRSA named  is introduced in detail. Finally, a 
separate section compared the computational expense of the 
schemes IDRSA and . The result of this study proves 
that  scheme is more efficient than IDRSA from both 
computational expense and the rate of growth of 
computational expense viewpoints. 
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